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Abstract
In this paper we will offer a few examples to illustrate the orientation of con-
temporary research in data analysis and we will investigate the corresponding
role of mathematics. We argue that the modus operandi of data analysis is
implicitly based on the belief that if we have collected enough and sufficiently
diverse data, we will be able to answer most relevant questions concerning
the phenomenon itself. This is a methodological paradigm strongly related,
but not limited to, biology, and we label it the microarray paradigm. In
this new framework, mathematics provides powerful techniques and general
ideas which generate new computational tools. But it is missing any ex-
plicit isomorphism between a mathematical structure and the phenomenon
under consideration. This methodology used in data analysis suggests the
possibility of forecasting and analyzing without a structured and general un-
derstanding. This is the perspective we propose to call agnostic science, and
we argue that, rather than diminishing or flattening the role of mathematics
in science, the lack of isomorphisms with phenomena liberates mathemat-
ics, paradoxically making more likely the practical use of some of its most
sophisticated ideas.
Keywords: Methods of Computational Science, Philosophy of Data Anal-
ysis, Philosophy of Science.
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1 Introduction: The Role of Mathematics in
Data Analysis
Data: what is given. It is difficult to find a more pervading word in to-
day’s scientific practice. In every field there is a surge of data collection,
remarkable not only for its size, unthinkable until recently, but especially
for its modus operandi : streams of values of variables are collected from a
given phenomenon, without the pretension of understanding how they can
contribute to the explanation, or simply to a suitable general description of
the phenomenon itself.
This modus operandi is implicitly based on the following, almost para-
doxical belief: if we have collected enough and sufficiently diverse data, we
will be able to answer any relevant question concerning the phenomenon it-
self. A striking and important example of such a trend can be observed in
biosciences, where the effectiveness of drugs or the detection of diseases are
approached, in practice, by studying clusters, similarities and other struc-
tured characteristics of huge arrays of chemical compounds (microarrays)
derived by gene, protein or even tissue samples. Microarrays may be super-
ficially seen just as one application of quantitative methods among many,
but we believe instead that they are a paradigmatic example, and we shall
term microarray paradigm the modus operandi that we highlighted above
and which we can summarize as follows: if we collect enough and sufficiently
diverse data regarding a phenomenon, we can answer most relevant ques-
tions concerning the phenomenon itself. Our point in choosing microarrays
as emblematic is twofold: first of all, the microarray paradigm is not limited
to biology, as we will explicitly show in Section 4. Moreover, by choosing
microarrays as paradigmatic, we stress the obvious fact that biology is be-
coming one of the main engines of quantitative scientific developments, and
of applied mathematics as well. The purpose of our paper is to clarify this
principle and to discuss the way in which mathematics is used within the
paradigm of science which goes with it.
∗ ∗ ∗
In this paper we will offer a few important examples to illustrate the ori-
entation of contemporary research in data analysis and we will investigate
the corresponding role of mathematics. The methods we describe in Section
4, neural networks, boosting, automatic control, are generally considered a
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form of statistical learning (or machine learning) [Hastie et al., 2001], to sig-
nify the automated, data-driven nature of these methods, and their ability
to learn structures from the data. Some of them, like neural networks, have
a long history and are very well established techniques, while others, like
boosting, are very recent new developments that have not yet been explored
in their philosophical implications. Our purpose is to show how all these
methods are characterized by a weakness of purpose, an inability to provide
general and appropriate models for the problems they are supposed to solve.
Above all we ask ourselves whether these methods can provide the basis of a
fruitful general methodology of data analysis and whether they present novel
philosophical questions, or methodological possibilities, distinct from those
generated by a more traditional way of doing science.
The examples we put forward show how the role played by mathematics
in the solution of empirical problems is changing drastically. This change
makes it possible for mathematics, even in its very sophisticated forms, to
play a significant role in domains that are relatively new to a quantitative
analysis, such as biomedical sciences and meteorology.
To better explain our argument, we note that, at the deepest and most
general level, mathematics is used to find symmetries and invariants and
therefore to give a structure to a particular phenomenon. The mathemati-
cian will then deduce more properties within the mathematical theory which
describes these structures, starting from suitable premises and principles ex-
pressed in the language of this same theory. This traditional approach pro-
duces a sort of isomorphism between some aspects of the phenomenon and
a mathematical structure; this isomorphism is not only responsible for accu-
rate, appropriate and correct forecasts, but, more importantly, it is taken as
a manifestation of the hidden nature of the phenomenon.
Current scientific practice in data analysis works differently. In this new
framework, mathematics provides powerful ideas and techniques which then
generate broad classes of generic computational tools. These tools will be
applied to large data sets to find the solution of a given particular problem.
While in some case the computational tools may be useful as an intermedi-
ate step between theories and phenomena, as stressed in [Humphreys, 2004]
and [Humphreys, 1995], more often the way they are applied to the data is
leading to a scenario where it is missing any explicit isomorphism between
a mathematical structure and the phenomenon under consideration. The
computational tools of data analysis therefore do not truly model the phe-
nomenon.
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According to [Donoho, 2000], this current trend in data analysis is tem-
porary and depends on a heuristic exigency in the face of new difficult prob-
lems. The present approach will eventually be replaced by another, more
traditional approach, which relies on new, yet undiscovered, theories. We
do not share this view. We believe, instead, that this trend is revealing a
new methodological paradigm, which characterizes data analysis to a large
degree. Far from being the result of a temporary inability of creating iso-
morphisms between phenomena and theories, this paradigm depends on a
new conception which is gradually imposing itself and which deserves to be
understood and appreciated as such. Instead of attempting to understand
and model a phenomenon, this paradigm suggests that a scientist needs to
approach a phenomenon with a limited set of assumptions, and needs to
look for specific techniques capable to solve some of the problems it presents,
without attempting any sort of structural understanding of the phenomenon
itself. From this point of view, each phenomenon requires its own descrip-
tion, that will vary according to the available type of data, that cannot and
should not be generalized to other phenomena that may be apparently simi-
lar. The tools that we apply may be similar for broad classes of phenomena,
but actual descriptions will be very sensitive to the individual characteristics
and fluctuations of the data from each phenomenon.
The methods used in data analysis are suggesting the possibility of fore-
casting and analyzing without understanding (or at least without a struc-
tured and general understanding). More specifically, we will argue in Section
2 that understanding occurs when we know how to relate several descriptions
of a phenomenon. Instead, these connections are disregarded in many data
analysis methodologies, and this is one of the key features of modern data
analysis approaches to scientific problems. The microarray paradigm is at
work exactly when a large number of measured variables concerning a phe-
nomenon are algorithmically organized to achieve narrow, specific answers to
problems, and the connections among different levels of descriptions are not
explored. This is the perspective we propose to call agnostic science and at
its heart is the methodological principle that we called microarray paradigm.
The notion of such a paradigm is not intended to fix a specific procedure for
questioning data, but rather an epistemic modality of our relation to them
and a modality of interaction between them and mathematics. In this sense,
even when we will talk of established statistical learning techniques such as
classification methods (cf. Section 4.1) and time series analysis (cf. Section
4.2), the focus is not on the technique itself, but on the way the technique is
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applied in the context of the microarray paradigm.
Rather than reducing the impact of mathematics in science, this approach
liberates mathematics from the constraints of strict isomorphisms; and it
allows a plethora of theoretical tools to be used in very practical scenarios
as we will explore in Section 5.
2 Scale and Understanding
For the purpose of this article, data analysis refers to the treatment of a
class of scientific problems considered as pairs composed by a phenomenon
and a specific problem about it. Concrete and emblematic examples of this
situation include the problem of forecasting the evolution of an hurricane
during a certain lapse of time, or the intriguing problem of determining
distinct sound sources from microphone recordings of their mixtures, what
is often called in the literature the cocktail party problem (cf. [Cichocki and
Amari, 2002]).
Some of these phenomena are such that their structure is partially known,
for example, the microscopic physics of a hurricane can be described by fluid-
dynamics partial differential equations, and yet the specific questions which
are asked about these phenomena resist any easy solution that relies on such
structure. In the case of hurricanes, the global behavior of the hurricane
cannot be easily deduced by the microscopic description, since, in practice,
any useful description of the evolution of an hurricane would involve ad-hoc
tuning of a great number of model parameters that are not implicit in the
microscopic physics. In other cases, for example, the reconstruction of the
independent sources of a mixed sound, we lack any clear and/or precise un-
derstanding of the phenomena themselves, since we do not know the sources
that generated the mixtures.
In both these general settings, the solution of the (empirical) problem
about the phenomenon under consideration depends, predictably, on the so-
lution of a mathematical problem that is connected to it. A deeper look at
these connections will indicate what frustrates our understanding of phenom-
ena, and it will suggest that the very notion of understanding is intimately
related to the multiscale nature of any actual phenomenon.
Consider again the study of hurricanes, here the phenomenon under con-
sideration is relatively well known insofar as its knowledge depends on a
representation by a system of differential equations derived from physics.
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The solution of this system, however, goes beyond the limits of our actual
mathematical abilities, and we are actually unable to effectively determine
the evolution of the hurricane from first principles. A typical strategy in such
cases is to look for a numerical simulation of the given system of differential
equations. This means that one looks for the determination of enough me-
teorological values to allow a sufficiently precise prediction of the behavior
of the hurricane. This process can be reduced to the problem of solving a
system of linear equations Ax = b, where A is a square matrix whose size is
very high, while b and x are two vectors, known and unknown, respectively.
The size of A depends on the number of values we want to compute: the more
fine-grained is this simulation, the larger the number of variables that the
discretization of the system will generate in the corresponding system of lin-
ear equations (cf. [Trottenberg et al., 2000]), and, again, our computational
abilities will be overwhelmed. In these cases, we need to resort to heuristic
adjustments that are not easy to justify from the microscopic physics of the
hurricane, as we pointed out earlier.
Let us now consider the cocktail party problem, i.e. the reconstruction
of the independent sound sources hidden in the recording of a mixed sound.
The data we consider in this case are the recordings of N long time series B =
[b1, ..., bN ] from a collection of microphones, and we assume that there are M
underlying sound sourcesX = [x1, ..., xM ], linearly mixed so as to produce the
recorded time series. Hence the problem can be modelled, once again, though
a system of linear equations AX = B where B now is a known matrix and we
have to find simultaneously the unknown matrices A and X. This problem
can be seen as the attempt of solving simultaneously several linear equations,
though we lack the relevant information to solve them uniquely, and it can be
solved only by making weak, but subtle assumptions on A and X (cf. [Lee,
1998]). These methods are so successful that they are called blind methods
[Cichocki and Amari, 2002], since they seem to be able to solve problems
without the necessary information. Their importance is growing especially
in signal processing and image processing, where it is difficult to model the
processes that generated the recordings and the images, and where blurring
and noise are a severe problem.
We can see that both for the mathematical problem derived from hurri-
cane simulation, and for the cocktail party problem, the size of the matrix A
depends on the precision we want to reach. In the second example, the size of
A determines the number of distinct sources that we want to identify, in the
first case, it determines the accuracy of the simulation. The technical term
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for speaking of such accuracy is scale. The notion of scale is usually involved
both when one is referring to the size of the discretization of the phenomenon
(as in the case of the hurricanes), and when one is referring to the number
of quantities or parameters involved in a computational description of such
a phenomenon (as in the case of mixed sounds). In both cases, one speaks
of fine and coarse scale: in the first case to indicate, respectively small and
the large sizes; in the second case, to indicate large or small numbers of
parameters.
∗ ∗ ∗
We have until now purposely used the term ‘understanding’ without a spe-
cific definition. Below we specify to some extent how we suggest to conceive
understanding in the cases we are interested in. However, our aim is not to
provide any detailed account of understanding for natural and social phe-
nomena. We mostly appeal to the notion of understanding negatively, as
lack of it, and all that we need is therefore a term of comparison for our
account of forecasting and analyzing without understanding. In principle,
such term of comparison could be provided by some of the accounts of scien-
tific understanding that can be found in literature, often in connection with
explanation (cf., among others, [Scriven, 1962], [Toulmin, 1963], [Friedman,
1974], [Achinstein, 1983], [Salmon and Kitcher, 1989] [Weber, 1996], [Trout,
2002], [Regt and Dieks, 2005])1. However, most of these accounts are too
specific for our purpose, since they make understanding dependent on some
specific logic or epistemic characters of our theories, models, or, more gener-
ally, our modes of acquaintance with the relevant phenomena, like deductive
power, entailment, unification, causality, reduction, minimality, representa-
tion of regularities, necessity, abstraction, familiarity, generality, simplicity,
etc. To use these accounts of understanding as terms of comparison in our
work would wrongly suggest that the contrast we would like to emphasize
depends on their specific characters, whereas the lack of understanding we
talk about is much more general.
For example, De Regt and Dieks’ recent account ([Regt and Dieks, 2005])
insists on the opposition between scientific understanding and algorithmic
1A few of these accounts specifically point to the way mathematics enters understanding
of natural and social phenomena as in works such as [Batterman, 2002] and [Morrison,
2006]; [Batterman, to appear] includes a critical discussion of more recent accounts of the
explanatory role of mathematics for empirical phenomena and it suggests an alternative
account as well.
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methods, or, more generally, calculations endowed by same appropriate math-
ematical apparatus. They propose the two following criteria (ibid., pp. 150-
151):
• A phenomenon P can be understood if a theory T of P exists that is
intelligible (and meets the usual logical, methodological and empirical
requirements).
• A scientific theory T is intelligible for scientists (in a context C) if they
can recognize qualitatively characteristic consequences of T without
performing exact calculation.
The relevant theories that De Regt and Dieks are concerned with are clearly
supposed to integrate a mathematical apparatus 2, and their account sug-
gests that the algorithmic and/or calculative procedures endowed by such
an apparatus do not enter science to provide understanding, but are rather
guided by a previous understanding that mathematical theories help to pro-
vide on top of algorithmic aspects. This anti-algorithmic bias is the specific
reason this account of understanding is not appropriate to provide the term
of comparison we need in our work, since it suggests in turn that the oppo-
sition between understanding and forecasting we would like to emphasize 3
depends on the fact that understanding is conceived in an anti-algorithmic
way.
2This is confirmed by footnote 7 (ibid., p. 167) where they write: “If one wants to
apply our analysis to non-mathematical, qualitative theories, we suggest to replace ‘exact
calculation’ by ‘complete logical argumentation’ ”. Moreover, by dealing with the example
of Boltzmann “qualitative analysis” of the behavior of gases under the effect of temperature
increasing (ibid., pp. 152-153), they remark that the purpose of this analysis “is to give us
understanding of the phenomena, before we embark on detailed calculations [. . . ][which]
are subsequently motivated, and given direction, through the understanding we already
possesses”. And they add: “Exact mathematical techniques [. . . ] are obviously essential in
modern science. What we emphasize in the importance of understanding as an additional
epistemic aim of science”.
3In his well-known 1974 paper on explanation and understanding ([Friedman, 1974],
p. 8), M. Friedman has remarked that “to have grounds for rationality expecting a phe-
nomenon is not the same thing as to understand it”, and mentioned, as an example of
it, indicator-laws that make us able “to predict some phenomenon on the basis of [. . . ]
initial conditions” without requiring “understanding of why the phenomenon occurred”.
Unfortunately, he has not developed this point neither in general nor in relation with data
analysis.
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More recently, [Lehnard, 2009] has made a case for a “pragmatic concept,
mode or account of understanding” (ibid., 171, 172, 182) open to the possi-
bility that understanding can be defined implicitly in terms of “the ability it
generates” (ibid, 173-174). According to such an account, understanding of a
certain phenomenon or situation would occur when we have a certain ability
for dealing with this phenomenon or situation in order to solve some prob-
lems concerned with it. Lenhard’s example is an instance of simulation, and
his major point is that in the face of simulation methods or algorithms two
opposite attitudes are possible (ibid., 183): either to stick to a “traditional”
concept of understanding, based on the idea that understanding is “linked
to a theoretical insight” (ibid., 172), and then maintain that simulation “can
provide control and options for intervention without understanding”4 (ibid.,
172), or to stick to such a pragmatic concept of understanding and then
admitting that simulation models can provide a mode of understanding.
Though the notion of understanding we refer to when we emphasize lack
of understanding is expressly general and weak (for the reasons indicated
above), it clearly does not conform to Lenhard’s pragmatic concept, and it
is still well-matched with the idea that understanding requires some sort of
“theoretical insight”. Moreover, though it is common to consider understand-
ing as a subjective or even psychological state, we do not want to emphasize
this aspect, and rather we take the notion of understanding to differ from that
of explanation not because the former is psychological and the latter logic,
but rather because we consider that understanding does not necessarily in-
volve an appreciation of the reasons for with something happens, whereas
explanation does. In our sense, understanding merely happens when some
structural connections characterizing the relevant phenomenon have been
identified.
From the perspective we suggest, the understanding of a natural or social
phenomenon is not intrinsically different from its description, at least if the
latter does not simply reduce to a mere collection of data. Rather, the
difference between description and understanding is a question of emphasis.
The statement of a problem concerned with a particular phenomenon, and
even the identification of the related problems, involves a form of description
that one could take as primitive or original understanding.
4Though Lenhard’s concern is limited to the case of simulation (which is a case we
consider only indirectly), this approach is close to the one we are aiming to describe more
in general and in details.
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When we speak in this paper of lack of understanding of a certain phe-
nomenon, we refer to a situation where one has not gone beyond such prim-
itive description. Specifically, a phenomenon has been identified; a problem
has been stated; and this is done by choosing a number of variables whose
particular, measurable values are supposed to characterize a particular state
of the phenomenon itself. However, we cannot say or establish anything else
about the phenomenon, since we have not advanced any hypothesis about
the mutual relation of the variables involved. In this situation, we say that
the phenomenon does not admit an understanding.
From the primitive description, one can move on to a more comprehensive
one, by relating different related variables to each other, or by introducing
new variables, to reach a new formulation of the given problem that can
help solving it. We can then take the new variables and their relations
and use them to solve problems that we could not even formulate before.
This is what we regard as an understanding in a proper sense, this makes
us able to relate several problems and different features about the same
phenomenon. This type of structural understanding is intimately related to
the scale at which we consider the phenomenon and his relation between
scale and understanding is so relevant that there are specific techniques in
some fields (most notably in physics) to relate descriptions at different scales,
as we will see in the sequel of the paper. We generally perceive some scales
as being more fundamental, because our physiological experience is limited
in space and time. What we need to know in these cases is how to connect
our description of a phenomenon at one scale to a description of the same
phenomenon at some other scale, since the fundamental quantities at different
scales may be different and have different relations.
Following a notion from physics (cf. [McComb, 2008]), we term renormal-
ization any transformation of a description at a fine scale J with its own set
of variables in another description at a coarser scale K with fewer variables,
obtained by encoding in a few new parameters the information relative to
the larger number of variables that are significant at the finer scale. Hence, a
renormalization of a certain description involves a (significant) reduction of
the number of variables entering such a description. Since the phenomenon
that is described is the same before and after the renormalization, this may
possibly lead to a new understanding of the phenomenon.
As a classical example of how renormalization leads to new understand-
ing, we note that in Newtonian mechanics, position, velocity, acceleration
and mass of every particle in a system allow a complete description of this
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system at any scale; as we move to very large systems like gases, understood
as instances of a Newtonian system, such description is in fact not achievable
in practice, especially when we try to predict the evolution of the system.
Therefore, in the case of gases, we abandon the Newtonian model and find
few other fundamental quantities, such as temperature and pressure, forming
a basis for another description of the same phenomenon and its evolution at
coarser scale. The essential point of this example is that the new description
results from a renormalization of the original one connected to it by some
rules that tell us how the Newtonian fundamental quantities have to be aver-
aged to give rise the thermodynamical quantities that we can observe (at least
in principle). This example can be considered the precursor of all renormal-
ization techniques in the history of science. Renormalization provides here
a macroscopic description of gases which goes together with a deeper under-
standing than the one that comes from their fine or coarse descriptions alone.
Specifically, the connections among different scale descriptions of gases are
made explicit.
Despite the crucial role that renormalization plays in the understanding
of many empirical phenomena, modern data analysis does not often relies
upon it. Instead, we see more and more frequently the development of fields
where the maximal scale of resolution (i.e. the finest scale at which the
phenomenon is observed) is decided on the basis of the possibility of quickly
generating large amounts of data at that scale, even though it is known
that a proper description of the phenomenon itself is possible at much finer
scales. In this way, different descriptions at different scales are detached
from each other, and we do not explain how to move from one to another.
The breakdown of distinct descriptions is most often due to pragmatic needs:
even though finer scale dynamics are still considered essential for a structured
understanding of the phenomenon, their consideration is excluded because
of a preventive decision based on inherent computational or experimental
limitations. Microarrays are a fundamental case where we see this breakdown
of knowledge at work 5.
5Note however that multiscale techniques are at the heart of modern data analysis.
There are very refined signal analysis methods, such as wavelets (cf. [Mallat, 2008]), that
are based exactly on idea of exploring the data at several resolution levels. But these
methods are used on whatever data is available, as a way to analyze, and preprocess the
data, very much in the spirit of an unstructured query of data, and they do not allow, by
themselves, the type of structural understanding that we defined in this section.
13
3 Lack of structural Understanding: The Mi-
croarray Paradigm
In order to understand where the microarray paradigm is coming from, we
need to take a short detour through some basic notions of experimental molec-
ular biology. Recall that the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) molecule is made
of two connected long chains (strands) of complementary building blocks
(nucleotides) that encode the genetic material of the organism. Some parts
of the DNA molecule are used in the cell for the production (transcription)
of related messenger RNA (ribonucleic acid) molecules that are involved in
the synthesis of proteins.
A DNA microarray (cf. [Hastie et al., 2000], and [Baldi and Hatfield,
2002] for a more mathematically oriented introduction) is essentially an ar-
ray of microscopic sites where up to several thousands different short pieces
of a single strand of DNA have been attached. Each microscopic site of the
array has attached to it several copies of the same short piece of DNA strand
to increase its chance of binding with the possible complementary strand of
messenger RNA (mRNA). The mRNA molecules are extracted from some
specific tissue and then amplified with a variety of techniques (chiefly poly-
merase chain reactions: cf. [Mullis et al., 1994]). They are marked with
some fluorescent substance and finally dropped on each site of the microar-
ray. Each site take a less or more intense florescence according to the amount
of mRNA that binds with the strands of DNA already placed in this same
site. The intensity and distribution of the fluorescence on the microarray give
thus a way to evaluate the degree of complementarity of the DNA strand on
the array, and the mRNA strands from the tissue.
The level of complementarity at a single site of the microarray is the
expression level of that particular strand of DNA . The set of all expression
levels on a microarray is called DNA expression profile of the tissue analyzed
with that specific microarray.The reason such emphasis is put on the amount
of different strands of mRNA is that the specific behavior of a cell depends
in great part on the activity, concentration, and state of proteins in the
cell itself. In turn, the distribution of proteins is influenced by the changes
in levels of mRNA. This correspondence of the information on the DNA
microarray with the behavior of a cell is by no means exact or univocal, since
the function of many proteins in the cell is not known, and several strands
of DNA are complementary to the mRNA strands of all protein types.
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Nevertheless, a DNA microarray carries a great deal of information about
cells: since thousands of strands of DNA are checked on a single microarray,
one expects to obtain a description of the state of the cells from the DNA
microarray. Such a description does not offer, however, an understanding of
the correspondent phenomenon. Any DNA microarray supplies a particular
value for a huge number of variables (the specific strand of DNA on the
individual sites) and therefore displays in some way the state of the cells
from the chosen tissue, but we do not know how to relate the values of the
variables directly to the state of the cells. We do not use some mathematical
theory to provide a systematic framework leading to the understanding of
the cell behavior, starting from the variables determined by the microarray.
Instead, we appeal to specific mathematical algorithms to simply classify
DNA microarrays, that is, to extract a minimal, but useful, information
from the huge mass of data.
If we are interested in the DNA expression profile of cancerous tissues, we
begin, for a given microarray, by comparing the DNA expression profile of the
cells of interest with that of some reference cells. We do this by dropping in
each site of the microarray some mRNA strands derived from cancerous cells
with green fluorescent pigment, and mRNA strands derived from healthy
cells with red fluorescent pigment. This procedure allows to see directly in
the quotient of green and red intensities which strands of DNA are activated
mostly in cancerous cells and which ones in healthy cells. Regardless of the
eventual role of these detected strands in the activity of the cells, we can
regard their respective degree of activation as a significant and characteristic
feature of these cells which distinguishes the cancerous ones from the healthy
ones. We can moreover classify the cancerous cells and theirs changes in time
after addition of potential drugs on the basis of their DNA expression profile.
We may realize in this way which drugs are effective, or detect a common
pattern that characterizes precancerous cells and so on.
Mathematics plays a crucial role in this analysis by providing the proce-
dures that make these classifications possible. Suppose for example that we
want to predict whether a patient has a specific cancer on the base of his
DNA microarray expression profile X. One way to approach this problem
is to turn it into a classification problem, and to consider several other pa-
tients that are known to have that specific cancer, and other patients that
are known to be cancer free. Assuming that the total number of such pa-
tients is N , we measure their respective DNA expression profiles x1, . . . , xN .
The DNA expression profile of each patient is then labeled with a value y
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that determines the class to which it belongs: for example, we can set this
value to be y = −1 if the patient does not have cancer and y = 1 if he
does have cancer. In this way, for each DNA expression profile x1, ..., xN ,
we get a corresponding value for y, say y1, . . . , yN . Finally we look for a
function f , belonging to a chosen space of functions, such that yi = f(xi),
i = 1, ..., N . Therefore, the empirical problem of prediction and classification
can be reduced to a mathematical problem of approximate interpolation in
which the classifier function f is determined, and we can predict whether the
initial patient had cancer with his DNA expression profile X by computing
Y = f(X). If Y = 1, the patient will likely have cancer, and he will likely
be cancer free if Y = −1.
The key to a successful solution of this classification problem is the iden-
tification of an appropriate space of functions F where we search for the best
function f that satisfies yi = f(xi), i = 1, ..., N . Such space has to be large
enough to adapt to the diversity of data we may have, but also small enough
to avoid to overfit these data: adapting f exactly to the data can entail the
risk of making f susceptible on possible noise disturbances in measurements,
as discussed at great length in [Ramsay and Silverman, 1997] and [Ramsay
and Silverman, 2002] 6.
Because of the very large size, and apparently random nature, of DNA
expression profiles, it is very difficult to determine a suitable function f in
the previous classification scheme. Often the variables of the DNA expression
profiles are split into groups that are significantly different, before attempting
the search for the function f that solves the classification problem. This is a
a technique aiming to reduce the size of the microarray variables, but it adds
another layer of complexity in the mathematical analysis of the microarray
that is not essential in our discussion (cf. [Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 2005]).
Incidentally, this reduction of the complexity of the data was at the basis
of one of the earliest attempts to find the philosophical implications of data
analysis, see [Good, 1983].
The microarray technique can be used also in other biomedical applica-
tions, we have for example the important case of protein microarrays [Simp-
kins et al., 2004], that directly check the activity level of several proteins at
once. The two basic conditions that have to be satisfied to make microar-
ray possible are: the ability to build large and inexpensive arrays of testing
6The structure of the general classification procedure we outlined here will be used
again in the description of the data analysis methods of Sections 4.1 and 4.3.
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sites in a reasonably short time; and the ability to detect, in a reliable way,
the expression level of the specific substances that are being probed at each
site. Solutions to biological and medical questions may be based on the
properties of microarrays, even though we know microarrays do not provide
any explanation of the biological functions, at fine scales, that determine
the macroscopic property—for example, presence or absence of disease—we
are interested in. The coarse scale biology, namely the presence of cancer
in an individual, is thus detached from the fine scale microbiology, namely
the specific structure of genes interactions, even though we know that some
fundamental piece of information related to our problem lies at the fine scale
level. It is in this sense that there is already a breakdown of structural un-
derstanding, before we even start to analyze the data. And the robustness
and legitimacy of the solutions gathered from microarrays is often extrapo-
lated by artificially adding noise to the data, and testing the reproducibility
of the classification results on these perturbed data (see [Simon et al., 2003],
section 9.5 and [McShane et al., 2002].), rather than by probing the possible
biological reasons that could explain the solutions we found7.
∗ ∗ ∗
To summarize, the mathematical study of microarrays is a clear example
of prediction and inference from unstructured data that is a trademark of
modern data analysis. According to a more traditional paradigm of math-
ematization of empirical sciences, especially exemplified in Newtonian sci-
ence, mathematical techniques are used in order to establish a conceptual
framework which provides a technical characterization of the phenomenon to
be studied. This characterization is understood as a mathematical structure
whose intrinsic relations make possible to associate a formalism to the phe-
nomenon itself. This structure provides an objective representation of the
phenomenon that makes it intelligible by involving appropriate interpreta-
tive categories (like, speed, force, energy, etc.)8. Moreover, the other purpose
of the mathematical structure is exactly to transform the phenomenon in a
7This is the case especially for large microarrays, like DNA microarrays. The analysis
of smaller microarrays, such as protein microarrays, is often followed by in vitro validation
of the results inferred through the microarray.
8Though in a quite different context (that of population genetics), M. Morrisson ([Mor-
rison, 2006], p. 340) has insisted on this point, by arguing that “mathematical abstraction
can play an important role in shaping the way we think about and hence understand
certain phenomena”.
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piece of mathematics, with local empirical inputs, to make possible to rely on
known techniques in order to prove theorems, solve problems and compute
values of quantities related to the phenomenon. In this way mathematics
works together with a conceptual interpretation of the phenomenon, which
is the modern form of what Aristotle, in the beginning of physics, termed
διαι´ρεσις : the reduction of the sensible data to a system of general principles.
Whereas in the traditional paradigm the identification of invariants is
largely a conceptual endeavor, in the case of the microarray paradigm, it is
essentially the outcome of an algorithm. In the main examples of Section 4
we will see how the data arising from a phenomenon can be directly used to
solve specific, narrowly defined, problems, making superfluous the concep-
tual identification of the variables that come with an understanding of the
phenomenon at different scale levels 9.
Needless to say, the data used in data analysis methodologies can hardly
count as raw (cf. [Harris, 2003]). As we have already emphasized, in order
for data analysis to apply, a phenomenon must be identified and a problem
about it must be stated. This is done by measuring values for a large number
of variables and different states of the phenomenon are taken to depend on
the measured data. In our parlance, this is a description of the phenomenon
itself, and this description is not only necessary for collecting data, but is
also already sufficient for organizing them. Still, there is a difference between
large amount of data, organized according to a certain description of a given
phenomenon (which assumes that the data are related to this phenomenon
and to particular problems relative to it), and a “model of data” in Suppes’
classical sense [Suppes, 1962]. According to Suppes, models of data belong
to a “hierarchy of model that connect data to theory” ([Harris, 2003], 1508).
Further, they are “designed to incorporate all the information about the
experiment which can be used in statistical tests of the adequacy of the
theory” ([Suppes, 1962], 258). Hence, models of data strictly depend on a
theory, and–however it might be conceived–a theory cannot help depending
on some sort of understanding, which is just what is lacking, in the case of
microarrays.
There is thus something in between a body of raw data and a model of
9The study of microarrays show that mathematics can be used to identify some useful
characteristics in a huge amount of data before, and independently of, any conceptual
interpretation. Even though the mathematical structure of the classification method used
for DNA microarrays does not fully capture the way the microarray paradigm can be used
as a methodological guiding principle in data analysis.
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data, and it is here that the microarray paradigm applies. In cases like these,
data are chosen and measured according to a basic description of a certain
phenomenon, but no theory and/or understanding is available for transform-
ing them in a model in Suppes’ sense. This does not mean of course that no
theory and/or understanding are necessary in order to provide the relevant
data. In the very case of microarrays, a significant background of genetic biol-
ogy, histology, and chemistry, is necessary to build such an array, and these
tools come with a very sophisticate understanding of related phenomena.
Still, these theories and the relative understanding are not illuminating the
phenomenon and problem to be studied, and therefore in this sense a microar-
ray is not a model of data for them. The microarray paradigm prescribes, in
cases like these, to apply mathematics (usually appropriate computational
algorithms) not in order to get a reproducible curve that fits available data
in an appropriate space (of the right dimension), or to transform them in
some suitable way so to produce a model ([Harris, 2003], 1510-1512), but
rather in order to question the data as such, to solve the problem before any
understanding 10. The way this is done depends of course on the particular
case under examination, and the microarray paradigm can prescribe neither
a particular method nor a family of methods to do it To understand how
the microarray paradigm can apply in other cases, essentially different from
the very case of microarrays (both for the nature of the phenomenon and
problem under examination, and the mathematical theories involved), other
examples are needed. We hope they might be useful to clarify the way in
which the microarray paradigm is exemplified in a variety of fields.
4 The microarray paradigm at work
Our selection of data analysis methodologies that exemplify the microarray
paradigm is very limited with respect to the great variety of methods that
we could explore. We have decided to highlight a few where we can see very
clearly that no understanding on the phenomenon is gained while solving the
problem.
10The very construction of a model (of data or of phenomena) requires some under-
standing and we purposely chose not to address the longstanding question of whether a
model represent reality, or is instead only an instrument for prediction. Our objective is to
show something different and stronger, i.e. that it is possible to make predictions without
models, and therefore without understanding.
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The first method that we describe in Section 4.1 makes use of artificial
neural networks, a well established technique that was first developed in 1943
in [McCulloch and Pitts, 1943]. We focus on an applications of neural net-
works to hurricane strength prediction, since this setting was already touched
upon in Section 2, and since it demonstrates that interpretable simulations
can be less effective than non-interpretable techniques. We move then in sec-
tion 4.2 to a subtle use of mathematics in the study of physiological data with
techniques from nonlinear dynamics. What is remarkable in this application
is that it is necessary to invoke quite advanced theorems on the immersion
(embedding) of geometrical structures in large ambient spaces. And yet the
actual model of the physiological data remains hidden up to the end. Finally,
section 4.3 summarizes one of the most interesting techniques in data anal-
ysis, boosting, that purposely does not build interpretable, efficient models,
and trades them for a powerful combination of weak, not-interpretable ones.
Two more methodologies that fit within the approach of the microarray
paradigm are briefly described in Section 5, but with a different purpose: we
will show that the lack of structural understanding in data analysis does not
diminish the use of sophisticated mathematical ideas, but on the contrary it
increases their relevance to very concrete problems.
4.1 Neural networks and hurricanes forecasting
We highlight in this subsection a method that uses neural networks to forecast
the intensity of winds of hurricanes (up to 48 hours in advance), on the basis
of a set of available meteorological data (cf. [Baik and Paek, 2000]).
We recast here neural networks in the language of classification problems
as in Section 3. According to this viewpoint, neural networks are nothing
more than a a very specific choice of space of functions of the input variables
used to perform approximate interpolation (see [Hastie et al., 2001], chapter
11 for more on this interpretation of neural network in terms of approximation
in functional spaces).The structure of the functions in this functional space
provides a primitive modelization of the dynamics of actual neurons.
The construction of neural networks can be seen as a two steps process.
First, input variables X = (X1, ..., XN) are preprocessed to get new variables
Zi = σ(α0i +
∑
j αijXj), i = 1, ...,M , where the parameters α0i and αij
are to be determined, and where the function σ is selected to mimic an
important property of the activation patterns of neurons, i.e. the fact that
their firing is very small when the input is small, and then suddenly large
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when the stimulus of the neurons is above a set threshold. Choosing σ to
be σ(r) = 1
1+e−r provides exactly such sudden switch of the intensity of
σ(r) as r goes from large negative values (when σ(r) ≈ 0) to large positive
values ( when σ(r) ≈ 1)11. Second, after defining the variables Zi, we try
to express the output variable Y as a linear combination of the variables Zi,
i.e. we adjust parameters β0 and βi so that Y ≈ β0 +
∑
i βiZi. This last
step is essentially the approximate interpolation step that we introduced for
the classification of DNA expression profiles in Section 3, with the notable
difference that the output variable is allowed to assume any real value.
It is remarkable that (cf. [Baik and Paek, 2000]) the use of neural net-
works gives better forecasts of the intensity of winds than the best available
simulations of atmospheric dynamics. In this context, the input variables Xi
are sets of measured meteorological data relative to a developing hurricane,
and the output variable Y is the intensity of winds of the hurricane after 48
hours. The crucial point of this method is that the structure of neural net-
works does not express any understanding of the hurricane dynamics. It does
not mirror in any understandable way the structure of the atmosphere: the
specific problem is solved, but with no new knowledge of the phenomenon.
Note moreover that only the ability to access a large quantity of measure-
ments for the hurricane during its development allows this technique to work,
in line with the general tenants of the microarray paradigm.
An interesting consequence of such opaque way to make predictions is the
compelling need of validating them very carefully. In [Kalnay, 2003], indi-
vidual predictions are validated by looking at ensemble weather predictions,
where several predictions are made, possibly with different methodologies
and different initial conditions, and only the most likely result, or group of
results, is then used for the actual forecasting. This technique clearly does
not improve basic understanding since, even though we may trust more the
prediction of a collection of methods because of a well understood a posteri-
ori statistical analysis, the individual methods will not be more transparent
because of this postprocessing. There is a similarity between the ensemble
forecasting and the boosting technique described in section 4.3, these paral-
11The historical reason for defining the variables Zi in the neural network procedure was
the belief that a plausible approximation of the structure of interconnected neurons in the
brain may be useful to approach complex problems (see the discussion of [Bailer-Jones and
Bailer-Jones, 2002] on the analogy to the brain). The distinctive feature that is believed
to be the key for the success of neural networks is their ability to adapt to input data in
a non-linear manner (cf. [Ripley, 1996]).
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lels are one more sign of a convergence, in different fields, to similar weak
approaches.
4.2 Data-driven control of seizures
Another very interesting problem in which a lot can be done without un-
derstanding the details of the phenomenon is the detection and control of
abnormal physiological behavior. Both electric cardiogram (ECG) and elec-
tric encephalogram (EEG) show complex, but deterministic, behavior at
the onset of heart arrhythmia (cf. [Christini et al., 2001]) and seizures,
respectively (cf. [So et al., 1998]). This behavior can be described with
relatively simple systems of differential equations x˙(t) = S(x(t)), where
x(t) = [x1(t), ..., xn(t)] ∈ Rn and x˙(t) is the vector of the derivatives of
each variable (cf.[Kantz and Schreiber, 2003]).
If the system of differential equations admits a low-dimensional region G
contained in Rn where most trajectories x(t) that satisfy x˙(t) = S(x(t)) con-
verge, we say that the system of differential equations has a low dimensional
attractor and knowledge of G encodes some important features of solutions
of x˙(t) = S(x(t)). The question is then whether G can be inferred from
measurements of the trajectories x(t).
In particular, assume now that we measure a single quantity q(t) derived
from the trajectories components, say q(t) = G(x1(t), ..., xn(t)), where G is a
differentiable function. We measure q(t) at a uniformly sampled set of time
values t = t0, t0 + dt, ..., T , with dt a small sample unit, T = t0 +Qdt and Q
some large integer value. These discrete measurements of q(t) can be used,
if the number of samples Q is sufficiently large, to gain a rough geometrical
understanding of the system x˙ = S(x), through the use of so called delay
maps. Essentially a delay map takes a fixed number d of consecutive points
in the measurement q(t) at constant intervals of τ starting from a given point
q(t¯) and maps them in the space Rd. If d is large enough the set of all points
mapped to Rd from a single measured quantity q(t) (for all possible values of
t¯), will often look like a deformation of the attractor G where the trajectories
of the system x˙ = S(x) converge (cf. [Alligood et al., 1996], [Takens, 1981],
and [Sauer et al., 1991]). It is somewhat surprising to realize that even
measuring a single trajectory variable can be sufficient for this technique to
work, i.e. we can take q(t) = xi0 for some index i0.
In the case of EEG data, delay maps allow, at least in principle, a data-
driven control of seizures as outlined in [So et al., 1998], see also [Kapitaniak,
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1996] and [Ott et al., 1990]. The key idea is to reconstruct the attractor G
associated to the EEG data from the delay map and to use this information
to prevent the trajectories from displaying the deterministic behavior that is
often a precursor to seizures, by using a suitable, slight perturbation of the
system. Since we can get an idea of the important features of the dynamics
from the delay map, we do not need a previous knowledge of the form of the
system, as long as we assume a simple enough deterministic dynamics before
a seizure. The information deduced from the delay map is enough to perform
some type of control of the seizure and, ideally, to avoid it.
What is essential to the functioning of this technique is the ability to
access long measurements of EEG data, which allows a rough geometrical
representation of the salient features of the dynamical evolution of the neu-
rons whose activity generated the seizure captured by the EEG. So the exact
equations in x˙ = S(x) are not necessary, and a graphical description of the
underlying dynamics is sufficient for this control technique to work. Note
again that, in principle (cf. [Kantz and Schreiber, 2003]), even a single long
measurement, i.e a measurement followed for a sufficiently long time, can
lead to a geometrical representation of the dynamics of the underlying sys-
tem. This implies that under suitable conditions on the dynamics of the
system, almost any single long measurement can be used to infer the general
characteristics of the system.
We can understand this result in view of the microarray approach if we
see that the diversity of measurements that is asked for in the microarray
approach is provided by the number Q of time samples of the measured
quantity q(t). This requirement is sufficient in this case because the dynamics
of the measurements is so complex, that the longer we record them in time,
the more we learn about the whole system.
Note also that the dynamics of EEG measurements cannot be equated
to the dynamics of single neurons. In practice the electrical signals we mea-
sure will be the sum of many electrical signals from nearby neurons. This
is also the fundamental reason why the actual dynamics of the neurons is
not directly used for the control of their collective behavior, i.e. of global
phenomena such as seizures. These techniques have been used in practice
with success for small groups of neurons, while their applicability to large
systems is still the subject of active research.
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4.3 Boosting
The previous two examples show to a great extent the characteristics that we
expect from an approach based on the microarray paradigm. Let us now con-
sider a mathematical technique which is having a consistent impact on data
analysis since its domain of applicability is wide, but whose ability to shed
light on the structure of the phenomenon is quite limited. This method goes
under the name of boosting, and it is remarkably well suited to be the back-
bone of a microarray-paradigm-based data analysis. Unlike what we have
done in the previous two subsections, here we only describe the algorithmic
outcome of this method, without specific applications. However, it turns
out that boosting is a way to put together weak classifiers (i.e. algorithms
that can distinguish classes of objects just a bit better than randomly) to
obtain an arbitrarily strong classifier, i.e. an algorithm that classifies objects
correctly most of the time. All the empirical classification problems we de-
scribed earlier in the paper could in principle benefit from this technique.
We give a quick description of boosting that closely follows [Hastie et al.,
2001], chapter 10.
Suppose we have a standard classification problem and that we consider
only two classes of phenomena, each labelled by a variable y that can take
values in the discrete set {−1, 1}. Suppose also that we can measure some
variables x associated with the phenomena belonging to both classes. As we
have seen in Section 3, a classifier is a function f such that f(x) = 1 if x
is a measurement of a phenomenon from class {y = 1} and f(x) = −1 if x
is a measurement from class {y = −1}. We take a weak classifier to be a
function g that correctly classifies measurements x with frequency f = 1
2
+ ²,
with ² fairly small, i.e. the frequency of right guesses is only slightly better
than a random guessing. Recall now that the function f is adjusted (trained)
according to a set of training measurements X = {x1, . . . , xn} where each
element of the set is known to belong to one of the two classes. The key
advance of boosting methods is to generate slightly different versions of the
classifier f , say f1,...,fn, by modifying the importance of each individual
measurement in X , before training the classifier. This is done according to
a rather sophisticated strategy that we do not report here (cf. [Hastie et al.,
2001] chapter. 10). It suffice to say that the final outcome of the boosting
algorithm is a classifier f¯(x) = sign[
∑
αifi(x)], where the coefficients αi
determine the importance of each individual weak classifier in the overall
classifier defined by f¯ . Note that f¯(x) can only take values in {−1, 1} and it
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gives therefore a formally correct prediction on the class of belonging of x. It
has been observed in some experiments that if the rate of correct classification
of each individual weak classifier fi is just 54%, then boosting can give a final
f¯ with success rate of 88% (cf. [Hastie et al., 2001] chapter. 10).
In [Freund and Schapire, 1999] (see page 10 of the English translation),
the initial developers of the boosting technique point out that such a tech-
nique depends on “a shift in mind set for the learning-systems designer:
instead of trying to design a learning algorithm that is accurate [...], we
can instead focus on finding weak learning algorithms that only need to be
better than random.” This approach to data analysis fits perfectly in the
context of the microarray approach, as it suggests that weak techniques can
be combined to obtain strong techniques that are devoid of any meaningful
interpretation.
5 Discussion. What Role for Mathematics?
Our claim in this paper is that modern data analysis, faced with increasingly
data-heavy problems, has challenged mathematics to assume a different role
in its relationship to phenomena. We have argued that, unlike the tradi-
tional approach in which mathematics models a phenomenon while fostering
its understanding, the modern paradigm used in data analysis gives up un-
derstanding, in favor of increasingly powerful forecasting tools. We have
summed up our claim under what we called the microarray paradigm, which
insists on the fact that enough, diverse data may help to solve most questions
related to a specific phenomenon, even though they may not shed any light
on its actual understanding. Our choice of terminology is heavily influenced
by the remarkable success that DNA microarray technology has had in mod-
ern biomedical applications, but we have included in our paper a series of
examples from other areas of current research, to show that, in fact, problems
far removed from microbiology lead to methods that can be interpreted and
systematized under the heading of the microarray paradigm.
We discuss now two recent works that tried to understand the method-
ological and philosophical implications of data analysis, and that come close
to our viewpoint. In section 3.1 of [Bailer-Jones and Bailer-Jones, 2002],
Daniela and Coryn Bailer-Jones contrast “data analysis models” with “theo-
retical scientific” ones. In elaborating the latter models, they argue that “one
is interested in determining the values of some important, physically mean-
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ingful parameter or parameters with the aim of better understanding” the
relevant phenomenon (they consider the example of a model for the temper-
ature variation in the Earth’s atmosphere). In data analysis, and especially
in computational data analysis, instead, “the primary interest is in training
a model to make predictions” and “the model parameters are a mean to an
end and not necessarily of physical significance themselves”. It follows from
their considerations that data analysis models “are conceived without regard
to the theories and concepts of the various problems to which they can be ap-
plied” and “are sufficiently general so that they can be applied to a wide class
of problems with only general requirements having to be met”. As a conse-
quence, “data analysis techniques are not specific to the type of data that
are modelled” and “are designed to be independent of specific applications”
or “application-neutral”. It seems thus that, for D. and C. Bailer-Jones,
data analysis is simply a set of techniques for computation and classification,
and it is, in fact, disjoint or poorly related to the study of phenomena. To
the useful techniques of traditional mathematization, data analysis is adding
new ones that are neutral, and that are used in practice more by relying on
the analogy among different phenomena than by developing insight in the
specific phenomenon.
While this neutrality viewpoint certainly captures some important charac-
teristics of data analysis, we note that any mathematical technique is neutral
by itself, and the use of analogy in shifting the same mathematical structure
from one field to another has been extremely successful also in a more tradi-
tional approach to science. Examples are the use of techniques from quantum
field theories in condensed matter physics [Altland and Simons, 2006], and
the use of techniques from the theory of spin glasses to optimization and
image processing problems [Nishimori, 1999]. We believe that data analysis
is indeed an innovative way to study phenomena, and not merely a collection
of convenient techniques. And we have tried to describe in this paper the
uniqueness and novelty of this approach to scientific discovery.
The author that explored most carefully the impact of computational
methods in science is Paul Humphreys. His work, culminating in [Humphreys,
2004], is mainly concerned with the way mathematical models of physics are
actually transformed into computational models with adjustable parameters,
or “computational templates”, as Humphreys calls them, which have effec-
tive predictive power. According to him, the computational models cannot
be developed unless the mathematical models have been worked out before-
hand. This means that a certain degree of understanding is necessary for
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computational science to work, even if this understanding is then weakened
in the development of effective predictive templates. In [Humphreys, 1995]
Humphreys argues that the effective prediction power of the latter is reached
through the use of a few mathematical forms that are valid across disciplines
(similarly to the neutral techniques of [Bailer-Jones and Bailer-Jones, 2002]).
This is certainly true in many cases. Humphreys mentions, as an example,
the case of differential equations, some of which famously apply to disparate
fields. Still, he does not highlight enough the profound shift in perspective
that leads often to radical, not simply pragmatic, removal of understand-
ing. In [Humphreys, 2004] (section 1.2 pp. 6-8), he argues that “our own
intellectual and computational capabilities as human beings is no more the
benchmark of scientific thought”, and in [Humphreys, 2009] (section 2) he
adds that “Computational science introduces new issues into the philosophy
of science because it uses methods that push humans away from the center of
the epistemological enterprise” and that:“[...]the situation within which hu-
mans deal with science that is carried out at least in part by machines [is] the
hybrid scenario and the more extreme situation of a completely automated
science [is] the automated scenario [...]”. In our view the changes brought
by the methods of data analysis are not simply an issue of automated versus
human science. They depend, much more fundamentally, on they way a phe-
nomenon is approached, namely on the fact that the aim of solving a specific
question and getting predictive power comes first, and is often opposed to,
the effort of getting any understanding.
A key question is rather whether the new modality of interaction of math-
ematics and empirical science can be fruitful not only in solving problems,
but in fostering new ideas in mathematics as well. While the answer may
be negative at some level, it opens a new perspective on the prominence
of mathematical thought in science. Mathematics has often benefited from
ideas and formalisms developed in physics, where a less rigorous development
of mathematical concepts pairs with the profound intuition that is generated
by the structural understanding of phenomena.
The lack of this structural understanding in data analysis does not di-
minish the use of sophisticated mathematical ideas, but on the contrary it
increases their relevance to very concrete problems. However, data analysis
cannot be a source of ideas and methods the way physics has been and con-
tinues to be. The microarray paradigm affects the development of method-
ologies by liberating mathematics from the necessity of strong isomorphisms
with phenomena. Mathematical ideas, no more constrained by the actual
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structure of the phenomenon, are free to directly affect the way we solve
problems. This process realizes itself not only by a strong use of analogies,
but literally by forcing the data to fit into known mathematical structures
of sufficient complexity.
Take the case of chemical graph theory (see [Bonchev and Rouvray, 1991]).
In this field, the graph of the links of the atoms in molecules is considered
crucial for the prediction of specific chemical properties of molecules, such as
toxicity, or carcinogen effect. Only the configuration of the links is consid-
ered, not the angles or the distances among atoms, so that we are effectively
looking at the topology of the graph. Prediction of a given chemical property
for a target molecule is obtained in two steps: first, by searching for topolog-
ical invariants that assume very close values for the graphs of a large number
of molecules with the chemical property; second, by computing the topologi-
cal invariant for the target molecule, and checking whether it assumes a value
close to the cluster of all the values computed in the first step. Because it
may not be transparent how the most suitable invariant relates to a chemical
property, this application of graph theory is very much in the spirit of the
microarray paradigm. At the same time, the topological invariants have to be
searched among those that carry significant graph properties, and therefore
we need a sophisticated knowledge of graphs simply to be able to propose
new invariants to test in the basic procedure highlighted above. Instead of
being a source of discovery of new topological invariants for graphs, chem-
istry becomes, in the context of this application, only a recipient of ideas
from advanced graph theory.
Another instance of forcing of mathematics on the data is the use of ge-
ometry in text organization and labeling. Here the assumption is that it
is useful to derive a well defined geometrical manifold from the data of a
problem, because on such geometrical object it is possible to define functions
that can be used for further manipulation of the object. Consider, follow-
ing the review in [Coifman and Maggioni, 2008], a collection of articles from
a multidisciplinary scientific journal. If we fix a large set of N , randomly
chosen words, the frequency of the n-th word for each article can be used
to define the n-th coordinate of a point in a N dimensional space. We can
then associate this point to the article itself. We obtain in this way a cloud
of points in the N -dimensional space, where each point is associated to an
article. There are standard techniques (cf. [Ramsay and Silverman, 1997])
to identify the directions of maximal variance of the cloud of points, and
these main directions can be used to visualize a low dimensional image of
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the set of points. The geometry of the low dimensional image carries inter-
esting information on the similarity of different articles, and even of different
topics; for example, it is possible to find out that earth science articles are
very close geometrically to biology articles, and, not surprisingly, mathemat-
ics and physics articles are close to each other. Conversely, the shape of the
geometrical image can provide automatically the labeling of article in distinct
topics. The body of work reviewed in [Coifman and Maggioni, 2008] (see also
[Szlam et al., 2008]) makes the further subtle observation that there are suit-
able functions on the geometrical manifold that can be used to preserve the
edges and the boundaries of the subsets associated to each topic. These func-
tions, too involved to be described here, are useful when we try to go from a
small set of labeled articles to a larger set of unlabeled ones. This process of
propagation of labels can be seen as a diffusion along the geometrical image
of the set of articles, and the functions defined on the object make diffusion
across edges difficult, so that mislabeling of unlabeled articles is minimized.
The resulting field of diffusion geometry (cf. [Szlam et al., 2008]) has a very
strong emphasis on finding techniques that lead from unstructured large dis-
crete sets, to geometrical, smooth objects, that are much better understood
mathematically. The emphasis on large data sets is clearly reminiscent of
the microarray paradigm, and the effort put in leading the data to a target
field of mathematics, exclusively for manipulation and analysis purposes, is
exactly what we mean by forcing.
These examples should clarify why the effectiveness of mathematics in re-
lating to phenomena is not affected by the methods of modern data analysis.
Only the flow of ideas is somewhat inverted, as mathematics is required to
take the lead in providing the setting and the quantities necessary for solving
problems, without receiving much insight in the process.
Mathematics becomes perhaps the only domain in which to develop struc-
tural understanding, since such pretense is lost in the study of phenomena.
Ideas are then forced upon the phenomenon in problem solving, only tem-
porary, and with little expectations that go further than the solution of the
problem. Scientific methods may become weak, but the mathematical lan-
guage in which they are phrased will be increasingly complex, as we attempt
to mould our desires, coarsely, upon reality.
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